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COMMENT
THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2036 TO INTER VIVOS
TRANSFERS OF STOCK IN CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS
I.

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Section 2036 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the
inclusion of inter vivos transfers in the gross estate of a decedent when
determining his federal estate tax. Such transfers are includible under
this section when the decedent-grantor retains either "(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income from, the property, or
(2) the right ...

to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy

the property or the income therefrom." 1 In situations where the decedent-grantor has transferred stock in closely-held corporations to a
trust, but has retained management powers in the stock, application
of this section has proven most difficult.2 Virtually all courts which
have passed on the question have held that mere retention of management powers does not cause inclusion of the corpus pursuant to
section 2036 (a) (1) .3 Retention of such powers is said to constitute
neither "possession or enjoyment of, nor the right to income from, the
' 4
property.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a). The complete text of this statute is as
follows:
(a) General Rule
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has
retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference
to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from the
property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate
the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
2. See Soled, Estate Tax Consequences of Inter Vivos Transfers of Stock in a

Closely-Held Corporation,31 MD. L. Rlv. 191 (1971).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 131 (1972); Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,542
(N.D. Ill. 1968); Soled, supra note 2, at 222. But cf. Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47
B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564 (1943).
4. E.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 133 (1972); Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
12,524 (N.D.
Ill. 1968).
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In situations where the settlor is able to maintain voting control
of the corporation through retention of the right to vote the transferred
stock, it has been urged that section 2036 (a) (2) causes inclusion of
the corpus in the gross estate. 5 With his voting control, the grantor
may elect a board of directors responsive to his wishes; as the board
of directors is responsible for the declaration of dividends, the grantor
will thus be able to influence the declaration of dividends. Since he
controls the flow of dividends, he controls the flow of income to the
trust; by withholding or declaring dividends, the grantor is able to allocate the income between the remaindermen and the life beneficiaries.
Hence, it may be claimed that he has retained the right to designate the
beneficiaries within the meaning of section 2036 (a) (2) .1
The Supreme Court was recently confronted with the above arguments, and was urged to find liability pursuant to section 2036 (a) in
United States v. Byrum.7 The majority of the Court, however, was
unpersuaded, and found the section ineffective to cause inclusion of
the stock in decedent's gross estate.
To determine the significance and impact of this decision, a critical examination of the nature and purpose of section 2036 will be
necessary, followed by an exposition of cases bearing special relevance
to the Byrum problem. Before proceeding further, a brief look at the
facts and reasoning employed by the Court in Byrum is in order.
II. United States v. Byrum
In United States v. Byrum, Milliken C. Byrum transferred stock
in three closely-held corporations to an irrevocable trust. Before the
transfer, Byrum had voting control in each corporation. The trust
instrument granted to the corporate trustee the power, in its sole
discretion, to apply the income and/or principal to the education, care,
maintenance, and support of the beneficiaries. However, the settlor's
retention of: (1) the right to vote the transferred stock; and (2) the
right to veto any sale of the stock by the trustee, caused the government to claim that the corpus of the trust was includible in his gross
5. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), afflg 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.
1971), aff'g 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970); Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55
T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971 INT. Rxv. BULL. No. 9, at 6. See Estate of George
H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945).
6. See cases cited note 5 supra.
7. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
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estate under section 2036 (a). A deficiency assessment was paid by
Byrum's executrix, and a suit to obtain a refund was brought in the
district court.8 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's holding for the executrix, 9 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 10 After examining the duties of both the settlor and
his board of directors in light of existing precedent, the Court held
that neither 2036 (a) (2) nor 2036 (a) (1) compelled inclusion. The
settlor had retained neither the right to enjoy or possess the property,
nor the right to designate the beneficiaries.
In order to establish tax liability, the government relied on two
arguments. Primary reliance was placed upon section 2036 (a) (2),
which requires inclusion when the right to designate the beneficiaries
has been retained. Byrum reserved the right to vote the transferred
stock, and this, coupled with the right to vote his own stock, gave
him voting control of the corporations." Since such control gave
Byrum the power to influence the dividend policy, and hence the
distribution of trust income, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
contended that inclusion was required. In dismissing this contention,
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted a lack of controlling precedent.' 2 No previous Supreme Court decision bore directly
on this question and the weight of existing lower court opinion
opposed the government's position. According to the majority, Byrum's
power to regulate the flow of dividends was directly limited by fiduciary
obligations imposed by virtue of his ownership of a dominant interest
in each of the corporations.' 3 This power was further limited by the
fiduciary duties owed by the directors both to the shareholders and to
the corporation, 4 and by the economic uncertainties inherent in any
small business.' 5 Mr. Justice Powell implied that these constraints so
8. 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
9. 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971).
10. 404 U.S. 937 (1971).
11. In one of the corporations, Byrum retained voting control exclusive of his
right to vote the transferred stock. The government chose not to distinguish this situation
from the transfers of stock in the two remaining corporations where retention of the
right to vote the stock was essential for Byrum to maintain voting control in those
corporations. "Thus, the Government [was] arguing that a majority shareholder's estate
must be taxed for stock transferred to a trust if he owned at least 50% of the voting
stock after the transfer or if he retained the right to vote the, transferred stock and
could thus vote more than 50% of the stock." 408 U.S. 125, 132 n.4 (1972).
12. Id. at 134.
13. Id. at 137, 142.
14. Id. at 138.
15. Id. at 139.
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severely restricted Byrum's alleged power, that it in effect ceased being
a power. The majority also noted that the statute purports to include
the property when the right to designate beneficiaries is retained. The
Court distinguished between a "right"-a legally enforceable obligation-and a mere power.16 As Byrum's power to influence the directors was hardly capable of legal enforcement, it was beyond the purview of the statute. Hence, inclusion of the corpus in the gross estate,
by virtue of section 2036 (a) (2), was unwarranted. As a policy argument, the Court noted that countless persons executing inter vivos
conveyances may have relied upon existing precedent which had indicated that retention of such powers would not lead to inclusion. 17
If the Byrum trust shares were brought into the gross estate, similar
trusts would be exposed to this unexpected peril.
After examining the fiduciary contraints, Mr. Justice White, writing for the dissent, concluded that they were in fact so minimal that
Byrum's power to regulate the flow of dividends was left untrammeled."8
He noted that courts have been reluctant to interfere with the discretion of the directors in suits seeking to compel greater payments of
dividends. 19 Further, the dissent observed that the majority's "reliance" argument was based merely upon an "archaic" 1929 Supreme
Court decision and an unappealed 1962 Tax Court case.20 Other cases
"provide only the most oblique reference to circumstances like those
of [Byrum] .... 21
According to the dissent, Byrum could not have assumed the
existence of any established doctrine excluding such trusts from the
gross estate, as a similar issue was being litigated in the first circuit
when his trust was created. Sufficient notice of the uncertainty in this
16. Id. at 136. The government had relied extensively on United States v. O'Malley,

283 U.S. 627 (1966), to establish liability pursuant to section 2036(a) (2). The majority rejected the applicability of that case to Byrum:
In our view, and for purposes of this case, O'Malley adds nothing to the
statute itself. The facts in that case were clearly within the ambit of what is
now § 2036(a) . . . . [TI]here the settlor had reserved a legal right [which the
Court in Byrum distinguished from a mere power], set forth in the trust instrument; and . . . this right expressly authorized the settlor, "in conjunction"
with others, to accumulate income and thereby "to designate" the persons
to enjoy it.
408 U.S. at 136. For a discussion of O'Malley, see text at notes 70-75 infra.
17. 408 U.S. at 135.
18. Id. at 158-59.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 162.
21. Id.
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area of law, having been provided,2 section 2036 (a) (2) liability should
23
have been imposed.
As an alternative basis for tax liability, the government urged
that Byrum had retained "the enjoyment of... the property" within
the meaning of section 2036 (a) (1). It was argued that by retaining
powers over the transferred stock, Byrum had enjoyed the property:
he had "enjoyed" the power to merge or liquidate, and he had "enjoyed" salaried positions with the companies. The majority observed
that section 2036 (a) (1) is limited to those situations in which pecuniary benefits obtain.2 4 They categorized Byrum's power to merge or
liquidate as merely contingent and speculative, not a "present substantial economic benefit." 2 5 His continued employment was viewed as
not having arisen from his retained powers, but rather from his position as a dominant stockholder.2 6 In so holding, the Court relied upon
uniform precedent which held that retained powers in and of themselves represent no retention of economic benefit. 27 Thus, inclusion
under section 2036 (a) (1) was deemed unwarranted.
The dissent focused upon the effect of the retained powers. Although Byrum had divested himself of any interest in the corpus, he
still retained the right to vote the stock. It was argued that "control,"
obtained from the right to vote the transferred shares, is an economic
benefit.28 This is recognized by case law, commentators, and commonplace "transactions on the stock exchange where tender offers ... repeatedly demonstrate that the power to 'control' a corporation will fetch
a substantial premium. ' 29 The dissenters urged inclusion of the corpus
pursuant to section 2036 (a) (1) because Byrum plainly had enjoyed
an economic benefit.
22. Id. at 167, citing State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (lst
Cir. 1959).
23. Additionally, the dissent argued that there is no difference between "power"
to designate, and "right" to designate beneficiaries; they pointed to language in
O'Malley where the two words were used interchangeably. 408 U.S. at 161. Assuming
this, the dissent observed that a settlor rendering the trust dependent on an income
flow which he controlled-limited merely by the general fiduciary obligations of the
directors-should be regarded the same as a settlor-trustee who retained the power to
allocate income between a life beneficiary and a remainderman, as in O'Malley. Id. at
157. For a discussion of O'Malley, see text at notes 70-75 infra.
24. 408 U.S. at 149.
25. Id. at 149-50.
26. Id. at 150.
27. Id. at 147.
28. Id. at 152.
29. Id. at 155. For the authorities relied on by the dissent in support of this contention, see id. at nn.4-6.
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To provide perspective for the Byrum decision, and as an aid in
understanding the significance and impact of Byrum., an exposition of
the historical background of section 2036 (a) is necessary.
III. HisroiucAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of Section 2036
The history of section 2036 (a) can be traced to a series of cases
which had indicated the need for a statutory enactment to include
certain interests in the gross estate of a decedent.
The first of this series was Shukert v. Alien.30 Decedent, fifty-six
years old, transferred securities to a trust, providing that the income
was to be accumulated in the trust for thirty years. 31 After such time,
the principal and undistributed income were to be divided among his
three children. Since the transfer left no interest in the settlor, and
the trust was not in any way affected by the decedent's death, the
Court held that the transfer could not be said to have taken effect
after the settlor's death.
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.32 extended the Shukert holding
by excluding from taxation situations in which a settlor transferred
property to trusts providing for life interests in the corpora for some
beneficiaries, with remainder over to others. The Court declared:
[W]e are asked to say that this statute means he may not make a gift
inter vivos, . . . absolute and complete, without subjecting it to a tax

if the gift takes the form of a life estate in one with remainder over
30. 273 U.S. 545 (1927). This case was decided pursuant to Revenue Act of
1918, ch. 18, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1097:
SEC. 402. That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or
personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated(c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created
a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death [(whether such transfer or trust is made or
created before or after the passage of this Act)], except in a case of a bona
eda
sale for a fair consideration in money or money's worth....
The bracketed portion of this text was deleted from the statute by the Revenue Act
of 1924, ch. 234, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 304.
31. This was to be subject to certain small deductions in case of the extreme
destitution of the settlor's wife or any of his children.
32. 278 U.S. 339 (1929). This case was decided pursuant to Revenue ,Act of
1921, ch. 136, § 402(c), 42 Stat. 278, which is identical to section 402(c), of the
Revenue Act of 1918. For the text of this statute, see note 30 supra.
I,
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to another at or after the donor's death. It would require plain and
compelling language to justify so incongruous a result and we think it
is wanting in the present statute.83
As an additional feature of this case, the settlor retained certain
administrative powers over the trust. The Court was urged to hold that
retention of these powers constituted "enjoyment," and that the
corpora were to be included in the settlor's gross estate, as the passing
of this interest was not intended to take effect until after his death.
The Court rejected this argument:
Nor did the reserved powers of management of the trusts save to
decedent any control over the economic benefits or the enjoyment of
the property. . . .The shifting of the economic interest in the trust
property which was the subject
of the tax was thus complete as
34
soon as the trust was made.
In neither Shukert nor Northern Trust did the settlor retain an
interest in the income or remainder of the transferred property. How35
ever, May v. Heiner,
relying on Northern Trust, held that the statute
was inapplicable when a settlor transferred property to a trust which
provided that the income was to be paid to her husband for his life,
and, if he predeceased her, to the settlor for her life, with remainder
to her children. The Court reasoned: "At the death of Mrs. May no
interest in the property held under the trust deed passed from her to the
living; title thereto had been definitely fixed by the trust deed."3 6
The presence of an intervening life estate in May became immaterial in three subsequent per curiam opinions. These cases held that
mere reservation of a life estate in the settlor was not sufficient to bring
the cases within the purview of the statuteY7
"The decision[s] of the Supreme Court came almost like a bombshell, because nobody ever anticipated such ... decision[s]." 3s' On the
same day that these three opinions were rendered, the Acting Secretary
of the Treasury sent to the Speaker of the House a letter requesting the
33. 278 U.S. at 347-48.
34. 'Id. at 346-47.
35. 281 U.S. 238 (1930). This case was decided pursuant to Revenue Act of
1918, ch. 18, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1097. For the text of this statute, see note 30 supra.,
36. 281 U.S. at 243.
37. McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931), rev'g Commissioner v. McCormick, 43 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1930); Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783 (1931), rev'g
Commissioner v. Morsman, 44 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1930); Burnet v. Northern Trust Co.,
283 U.S. 782 (1931), aff'g Commissioner v. Northern Trust Co., 41 F.2d 732 (7th Cir.
1930).
38. 74

CONG.

Ruc. 7078 (1931) (remarks of Mr. Smoot).
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enactment of a joint resolution amending the statute so as to apply to
life interests retained by a settlor.89 The following day a resolution
was passed which provided for inclusion in a settlor's gross estate of
a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life or any
period not ending before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment
of, or the income from, the property or (2) the right to designate the
persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom ....
40

The language of the resolution was modified by the Revenue Act
of 193241 to ensure inclusion of the property when a decedent had retained income, not necessarily for life, but for a period measured by
the date of the death of the grantor. " In addition, the amended statute
provided that inclusion of the corpus in the gross estate would not be
avoided if the right to designate the beneficiaries was exercisable by the
grantor with other persons. 43 The language of these provisions44 is substantially the same as that currently found in section 2036 (a).
39. Letter from Ogden L. Mills to Speaker of the House, Mar. 2, 1931, reported
in 133 BNA T.M., RETAINED LIFE INTERESTS B-15 (1967).
40. Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, ch. 454, 46 Stat. 1516-17.
41. Ch. 209, § 803(a), 47 Stat. 279. This statute amends the Joint Resolution
of Mar. 3, 1931 to read:
SEc. 302. The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated, [except real property situated outside
of the United States]
(c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, or of which he has at
any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained
for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death
or for any period which does not in fact end before his death (1) the possession
or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the
right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; except in
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth....
The bracketed portion in the text was to be inserted by the Revenue Act of 1934, ch.
277, § 404, 48 Stat. 754. The statute, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1934, was
subsequently incorporated verbatim into Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(c), 53
Stat. 120, 121.
42. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1931); S. REP. No. 665, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50 (1931).
43. Reports cited note 42 supra.
44. The joint resolution and the 1932 amendment were found to be constitutional
in Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938). Additionally, they were found not to be
retroactive, i.e., they were not to apply to transfers made prior to their enactment.
Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
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Klein v. United States45 was the first case decided by the Supreme
Court after the enactment of the revised statute. That case involved a
transfer of a life estate in real property to the grantor's wife. If his wife
survived him, she was to take the parcel in fee. Since the grantor remained vested with the fee, and had provided that the property was to
become vested in the grantee only if she survived him, the Court held
that the grantor's death was the "indispensable and intended event
which brought the larger estate into being for the grantee. '46 The value
of the property after deducting the value of the life estate was to be
included in his gross estate as this was a transfer "intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at . . .[the grantor's] death .. .
Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,48 decided four years
later, involved a transfer of property to a trust which provided the
settlor's daughter with income for life, remainder to other beneficiaries.
However, a reversionary interest was reserved in the grantor, should
his daughter predecease him. In a five to four decision, the Court held
that the corpus was not includible under the statute, because the
settlor's power to resume ownership was merely based "upon a contingency in the nature of a condition subsequent, the occurrence of
which was entirely fortuitous .... 49 Klein was distinguished as in-

volving a condition precedent: Before title would vest in grantor's
wife she had to survive the grantor. By contrast, in St. Louis Union
50
Trust a defeasible title vested at the execution of the trust instrument.
After St. Louis Union Trust, it appeared that inclusion of the
transferred property in the gross estate would turn upon subtle distinctions in the law of property. Helvering v. Hallock,51 however, re45.

283 U.S. 231 (1931).

This case was decided pursuant to the Revenue Act

of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1097. For the text of this statute, see note 30 supra.
46. 283 U.S. at 234.
47. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1097.
48. 296 U.S. 39 (1935). This case was decided pursuant to Revenue Act of 1924,
ch. 234, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 304. For the text of this statute, see note 30 supra.
49. 296 U.S. at 43.
50. Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935), a similar case, was
decided the same day as Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935).
In the former case, a settlor transferred property to a trust, providing a life estate for
his daughter, and a remainder to her. If she were to predecease him, the property was
to revert back to the settlor. The Court relied on its opinion in Helvering v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co. to hold section 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 ineffective to cause
inclusion of the corpus in his gross estate. For the text of Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27,
§ 302(c), 44 Stat. 70, see note 51 infra.
51. 309 U.S. 106 (1940). This case was decided pursuant to Revenue Act of
1926, ch. 27, § 302(c), 44 Stat. 70. That statute reads:
Sac. 302. The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
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moved this notion by specifically overruling St. Louis Union Trust. 2
Hallock adopted the rule announced in Klein: A reversionary interest
retained in the grantor would subject such property, less the value of the
life estate, to inclusion in the gross estate. The statute was designed to
tax transfers which become complete only at the grantor's death.
Whether title became vested in the grantee when the conveying instrument was executed, or at the grantor's death, was irrelevant. In either
case, where the grantor retained a reversionary interest, the transfer
remained incomplete until his death. Hallock subordinated the "recondite learning of the ancient law of property" to "the plain purposes
53
of a modern fiscal measure."
In Commissioner v. Estate of Church,5 4 a settlor reserved to himself for life the right to the income from a trust, remainder to certain
named beneficiaries. Depending upon the interpretation of then existing state law, the settlor may have impliedly reserved a possibility of
reverter. The Supreme Court held that his retention of the income
for life was sufficient to compel inclusion of the trust in his gross estate.
Consequently, an interpretation of the state law regarding the possibility of reverter was unnecessary. To arrive at this holding, it was
necessary for the majority to overrule May; 5 the cases were irreconcilable. The authority of May had been severely diminished nine years
earlier by Hallock. In Estate of Church the majority cited Hallock
approvingly:
"In determining whether a taxable transfer becomes complete only
at death we look to substance, not to form ....

However we label

the device [, if] it is but a means by which the gift is rendered incomby including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated:
(c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth....
52. At the same time, Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935),
was also overruled.
53. 309 U.S. at 112. Estate of Speigel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949),
expanded the inclusion of reversionary interests by holding: 1) that such interests do
not have to be expressly retained to cause inclusion in the gross estate; and 2) where
such interests are retained, inclusion of the entire corpus is mandated, regardless of
the probability of the reversionary interest succeeding. For the Congressional reaction to
Estate of Speigel, see Technical Changes Act of 1949, ch. 720, § 7(a), 63 Stat. 894-95.
54. 335 U.S. 632 (1949). This case was decided pursuant to Int. Rev. Code of
1939, ch. 3, § 811(c), 53 Stat. 120, 121. For the test of this statute, see note 41 supra.
55. 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
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plete until the donor's death" the "possession or enjoyment" provision applies.5 6
Since the settlor maintained the right to the income throughout his life,
it could not be until his death that such property could truly pass to
the beneficiaries. His retention of the income should thus provide a
sufficient basis for including the corpus in his gross estate.57
Thus, after a period spanning more than twenty-two years, it
was established that a retained life interest was subject to the estate
tax. The 1954 revision of the Internal Revenue Code incorporated the
1932 statute, as amended, into section 2036. That section is appro58
priately entitled Transfers with Retained Life Estate.
Having reviewed the Supreme Court decisions responsible for the
evolution of section 2036, cases bearing special relevance to the Byrumtype situation may now be examined. These cases demonstrate how
the statute has been applied when the grantor has reserved a power
in the transferred property.
B. Retained Powers and Section 2036
The first, and perhaps the most important, of these cases is Jennings v. Smith.59 There, the settlor created two irrevocable trusts for
the benefit of the family of each of his two sons. He and his sons were
named as trustees. They were empowered to accumulate income during the life of each son, but were permitted to distribute such income
should they "[d]etermine that such disbursement is . . . necessary to
enable the beneficiary ... to maintain himself and his family ... in
comfort and in accordance with the station in life to which he be60
longs."1
It was argued by the Commissioner that the corpus should
be included in the settlor's gross estate because he retained the right
to designate the beneficiaries. The court disagreed:
[W]e think the decedent effectively put that "right" beyond his own
control or retention by imposing conditions upon the exercise of it
56. 335 U.S. at 644, quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 114 (1940).
57. For the Congressional reaction to Estate of Church, see Technical Changes
Act of 1949, ch. 720, §§ 7(b), 8, 63 Stat. 895, 896.
58. Other provisions from the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803(a), 47 Stat.
279, have been incorporated into the current Code, i.e., § 2035-Transactions in Contemplation of Death, and § 2037-TransfersTaking Effect at Death.
59. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947). This case was decided pursuant to Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(c), 53 Stat. 120, 121. For the text of the statute, see note 41 supra.

60. 161 F.2d at 75-76.
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[i.e., external standards]. A "right" so qualified that it becomes
a duty enforcible in a court of equity on petition by the beneficiaries
does not circumvent the obvious purpose of [the predecessor of
§ 2036(a) (2)] .... Only when the interest of some beneficiary is enlarged or matured by the decedent's death is [the predecessor
of § 2036(a)] applicable .... 61
Jenningswas expanded in State Street Trust Co. v. United States.0 2
In that case, the settlor created three irrevocable trusts in which he was
designated a cotrustee. The trustees were to pay to the life beneficiaries:
(1) the income; and (2) portions of principal which the trustees, in
their sole discretion, might deem necessary "for the beneficiaries'
'comfortable maintenance and/or support.' ,,03 Additionally, the trustees had the power to make investments in property and securities not
ordinarily considered suitable for a trust, including both highly speculative and wasting investments. They could also determine, in their
discretion, what was to "be charged or credited to income and what
64
to principal notwithstanding any determination of the courts ....
These powers were conceded by the government to provide a determinable standard, enforceable in equity pursuant to Jennings, but the
Commissioner nonetheless urged that the right to designate beneficiaries
had been retained. It was alleged that the powers still enabled the shifting of the benefits of the trust between the income beneficiaries and
the remaindermen. The First Circuit recognized that a court of equity
would impose certain limitations on the exercise of the trust powers,
but concluded:
The area of the trustees' discretion, although not untrammelled, is
about as broad as language can make and the law permits, and within
that area the trustees can act in the administration and management
of their trusts to confer or withhold very substantial benefits as between the life tenants and remaindermen. 65
It continued:
Perhaps no single power conferred by the decedent on the trustees would be enough to warrant inclusion of the corpora of the trusts
61. Id. at 78-79.
62. 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959). This case was decided pursuant to Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(c), 53 Stat. 120, 121. For the text of this statute, see note
41 supra.
63. 263 F.2d at 637.
64. Id. at 638.
65. Id. at 639.
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in his estate. But we believe that the powers conferred on the trustees, considered as a whole, are so broad and all inclusive that within
any limits a...
court of equity could rationally impose, the trustees
within the scope of their discretionary powers, could very substantially shift the economic benefits of the trust between the life tenants
and the remaindermen. 66
Thus, it was found that the settlor as trustee, had retained the right to

designate the beneficiaries of the property and income. Consequently,
the corpus was subject to inclusion in the gross estate.
Estate of Willard V.King67 began the erosion of State Street Trust.
In King, the settlor created three irrevocable trusts, with certain beneficiaries to receive the income for life, others to receive the remainder.
The grantor reserved the right to direct the trustee in making investments: "speculative, extrahazardous, and unproductive" investments
were expressly permitted. The Commissioner contended that the reservation of this power could enable the settlor "to increase the interests
of the life income beneficiaries to the detriment of the remaindermen,
or vice versa."0 18 This would render the corpus of the trust taxable,
because the settlor would have retained the right to designate beneficiaries within the meaning of section 2036 (a) (2). In rejecting this
contention, the Tax Court observed that under state law the settlor
was bound to exercise his powers in a fiduciary capacity.6 9 It was also
noted that only cash dividends were to be distributed as income. Because the decedent retained no right to divert any of the corpus to the
income beneficiaries, or to divert any income to the remaindermen,
King could be distinguished from State Street Trust. The court held
that since the settlor was bound not to favor one class of beneficiaries
to the detriment of the other, he lacked the power to designate who
should enjoy the property within the meaning of section 2036 (a) (2).
In United States v. O'Maley,7 0 the settlor created five irrevocable
trusts, granting to the trustees, of whom he was one, discretion either
to pay the income to the trust beneficiary or to accumulate it. It was
66. Id.
67. 37 T.C. 973 (1962). This case was decided pursuant to INT. Rav. CODE OF
1954, § 2036(a). For the text of this statute, see note 1 supra.
68. 37 T.C. at 978.
69. Id. at 979.
70. 383 U.S. 627 (1966). This case was decided pursuant to Technical Changes
Act of 1949, ch. 720, § 7(a), 63 Stat. 894-95, amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3,
§ 811(c), 53 Stat. 120, 121. The text of this statute as amended is identical to the
text of INT. REv. CODE OF,1954, § 2036 (a), note 1 supra.
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conceded on appeal that the corpora were to be included in decedent's
gross estate pursuant to a predecessor of section 2036 (a) (2).71 The
settlor plainly had the right, as trustee, to allocate the income from the
trust between the life beneficiaries and the remaindermen. The executor of the estate, however, contested the inclusion of the accumulated
income in the gross estate. He sought to equate the situation in
O'Malley to one in which a completed transfer of property is made to
an irrevocable trust in contemplation of death. There, the income to
the trust after the date of transfer is not deemed includible in the
gross estate.7 2 The Court rejected this contention. The cases relied on
by the lower court expressly distinguished their situations from those
similar to O'Malley. In including such accumulated income in the
gross estate, the Court observed that when the settlor chose to accumulate the income it became part of the principal.78 As the settlor was then
empowered either to distribute or to accumulate the income produced
by each increment, he was able to designate the beneficiaries within
the meaning of the statute.
It is difficult to project O'Malley against any trend. The Court in
Byrum said of O'Malley that it added nothing to the interpretation of
the statute-it was clearly within the statutory language.74 The conflicting interpretation offered by the Seventh Circuit was apparently the
sole factor compelling Supreme Court's resolution of this "obvious"
75
case.
J 76
Yeazel v. Coyle
is one of the few cases dealing directly with

voting control maintained by the settlor through the retention of the
right to vote the transferred stock. In Yeazel, the settlor transferred
stock to a trust, appointing herself sole trustee. She named four income
beneficiaries, with the corpus to be distributed to them ten years after
the execution of the trust. The voting rights that the settlor held as
trustee, together with the voting rights in other stock that she owned,
gave her the right to vote all the outstanding stock. The government
71. Technical Changes Act of 1949, ch. 720, § 7(a), 63 Stat. 894-95, amending
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811 (c), 53 Stat. 120, 121.
72. Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952), aff'g 14 T.C.
1263 (1950); Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'g 9 T.C. 979
(1947).
73. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 632-33 (1966).
74. 408 U.S. at 136.
75. See 383 U.S. at 630.
76. 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 112,524 (N.D. I1. 1968).
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argued for the imposition of liability pursuant to either section
2036 (a) (1) or Revenue Ruling 67-54. 77 The court observed that the
trust instrument explicitly provided that the settlor would retain no
direct pecuniary benefit, and found that none had in fact been retained.
Additionally, it was found that the settlor possessed or enjoyed no indirect economic benefit. The court reasoned that if she prevented the
corporation from issuing dividends by the exercise of her voting control, the retained earnings of the corporation would thereby increase,
making the stock more valuable. The court suggested that since the
income beneficiaries and the remaindermen were identical, they could
each realize current income by borrowing against the stock. This
reasoning necessarily led to the conclusion that Revenue Ruling 67-5478
would not be applied, and that section 2036 (a) (1) was not applicable.
The State Street Trust rule of aggregate powers came to its demise in Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States.7 9 A settlor created a
trust for his son and appointed himself trustee. According to the trust
instrument, eighty percent of the income was to be paid to his son,
with the difference to be accumulated. However, the percentage of
income might be increased if the trustees, in their sole discretion, determined that "such increase [was] needed in case of sickness, or desirable in view of changed circumstances."8' 0 The trustees had discretion to stop paying income to the son when they deemed it in his best
interests to do so. Further, article 7 of the trust agreement granted the
trustees broad powers of investment (similar to those held in State
Street Trust). The government urged inclusion in the decedent's gross
estate under section 2036 (a) (2). The First Circuit conceded that if
State Street Trust was correctly decided, section 2036 (a) (2) would be
applicable, as the powers provided to the grantor-trustee in article 7
77. 1967-1 Cum.BULL. 269. This ruling provides that
[w]here a decedent transfers nonvoting stock in trust and holds for the remainder of his life voting stock giving him control over the dividend policy
of the corporation, he has retained, for a period which did not in fact end
before his death, the right to determine the income from the nonvoting stock.
If he also retains control over the disposition of the nonvoting stock, whether
as trustee, by restrictions upon the trustee, or alone or in conjunction with
another, he has in fact made a transfer whereby he has retained for his life the
right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the transferred
property or the income therefrom.

78.
79.
CODE OF
80.

Id.
423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970). This case was decided pursuant to
1954, § 2036(a). For the text of this statute, see note 1 supra.
423 F.2d at 602.
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were substantially the same as those retained by the settlor-trustee in
the earlier case.
The Old Colony Trust court reasoned that State Street Trust was
premised upon the similarity of the retained aggregate powers to incidents of ownership, and they observed that a court of equity could
always review the exercise of these powers. Since such judicial review
was inconsistent with incidents of ownership, the First Circuit held
that State Street Trust was wrongly decided and need not be followed.,,
The court held, however, that the present corpus was includible in
the gross estate, because the settlor-trustee had retained the right to
curtail the payments of income from the trust to the beneficiary, when
it was deemed to be in the latter's "best interests." "Best interests"
was found to lack a sufficiently limited external standard; hence there
was no constraint upon the power within the Jennings rule.
The district court in United States v. Byrum8 2 also found Jennings
applicable to the facts of that case. They held that
decedent's power to control the trust property was not without limitation and the Court [considered] that sufficient control was relinquished [by Byrum], and sufficient checks were retained on what control was retained .... 88

Hence, Byrum was deemed not to have reserved the right to designate the beneficiaries within the meaning of section 2036 (a) (2).
Additionally, the court observed that section 2036 (a) (1) would
apply only if Byrum had "enjoyed" the property. It was noted that
enjoyment connotes retention of pecuniary benefit. Relying upon
Yeazel, the court concluded that Byrum had not enjoyed the property
within the meaning of section 2036 (a) (1), as he had retained no
monetary benefit from the transferred stock.
The Sixth Circuit agreed with both of these contentions.8 4 Relying upon Yeazel and King, it held that Byrum had not enjoyed the
property within the meaning of section 2036 (a) (1).
81. It should be noted that nowhere in State Street Trust is a similarity drawn
between the retained aggregate powers and incidents of ownership. Rather, the analogy
sought is between the effect of the total "limited" powers and the effect of a single unlimited power. Although undermined regarding section 2036(a) (2) applications, State
Street Trust has been applied to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2055. E.g., Estate of

Stewart v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 1281, 1288 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
828 (1971).
82. 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
83. Id. at 896.
84. 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971).
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Similarly, regarding the right to designate the beneficiaries, the
court noted that Byrum merely retained the power to elect the directors
-the latter were to be bound by a fiduciary obligation to exercise
sound business judgment in declaring dividends. On applying Jennings, the court found that
[the fiduciary] obligation [was] governed by an ascertainable standard
and [was] analogous to the situation which [existed] in cases where
the grantor [retained] broad managerial control of a trust,... and [did]
not result in making these assets includible in the grantor's estate.8 5
Although Revenue Ruling 67-54 tended to support the Government's
position, it did not have the force of law and was merely persuasive
of that position.8 6 Since it was in conffict with the law as interpreted by
s Thus, the
the courts, the Sixth Circuit chose to disregard it.8
stock
could not be included in Byrum's estate pursuant to section
2036 (a) (2), as he had not retained the right to designate the beneficiaries.
IV. ANALYSIS

Having presented the general historical background to section
2036 (a), as well as cases bearing directly on the Byrum-type problem,
an analysis of Byrum and similar situations may now properly be undertaken. To facilitate this discussion assume the following hypothetical:
A settlor has transferred stock in a closely-held corporation to an irrevocable trust. He has provided for the distribution of both the income and corpus to beneficiaries other than
himself, and, by the terms of the instrument, stipulated that
he can never become a trustee. He has, however, retained the
right to vote the transferred stock.
A. Section 2036(a) (1)
Consider the application of section 2036 (a) (1) -the retention
or "possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income from, the property"-to the aforementioned hypothetical. Clearly, the settlor does
85. Id. at 952.
86. See note 77 supra.
87. 440 F.2d at 952-53.
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not have any right to the income; it is the beneficiaries' alone.88 Similarly, the grantor lacks possession-that is reserved for the trustee.8s
Under certain circumstances, however, it may be argued that the settlor
has retained enjoyment of the property. In fact, ever since Reinecke
v. Northern Trust Co.90 this position has been urged by the government.91
For the tax to apply, however, it must be shown that the grantor
retained some pecuniary benefit. 92 According to an oft-cited quotation:
"['Enjoy' and 'enjoyment'] are not terms of art, but connote substantial economic benefit.1 93 Thus, if a grantor transfers stock (not constituting voting control) without owning additional stock, 94 without
having the right to vote additional stock, 95 and without having at the
time an option to acquire additional stock (in that same corporation) ,00
the mere retention of the right to vote the transferred stock will not
constitute a pecuniary benefit. However, a legitimate question of statutory applicability will arise where the grantor has either ownership of
additional stock, 97 the vested right to acquire such ownership (for
example, purchase options),0s or merely the right to vote additional
stock,9 9 and one or more of these-combined with his right to vote the
transferred stock-will give him voting control of the corporation.
It may be argued that the grantor has retained a "substantial economic benefit" in the form of control, and could thus be said to have
"enjoyed" within the meaning of the statute. It is undoubtedly true
that such control has a monetary value. 0 0 This was correctly recog88. See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524' (N.D.
I1. 1968). Cf. Soled, supra note 2, at 221-22.
89. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 175 (1959); 2 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF
TRuSTS § 175, at 1415-18 (3d ed. 1967). Cf. materials cited note 3 supra.

90. 278 U.S. 339 (1929).

91. See Soled, supranote 2, at 222.
92. See materials cited note 3 supra.

93. Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 486 (1946).
94. E.g., Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
95. E.g., Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT.

REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6.
96. Cf. Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945).

97. Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
12,524 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Cf. Reinecke
v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929); Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807
(1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564 (1943).
98. E.g., Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945).
99. Cf. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6.

100. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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nized by the dissent in Byrum. 01 Among other things, such control can
02
be used to influence a corporation to declare or withhold dividends'
and to ensure that the holder will maintain an office or directorship
within the corporation. 03 This retained control represents substantial economic benefit to the grantor. If he transferred stock representing a controlling interest (for example, more than one half of the outstanding stock) to the trust, perhaps the above argument would be
persuasive. The retention of the right to vote such transferred stock
would be congruent with the voting control; 0 4 hence "economic benefit" within the meaning of section 2036 (a) (1) would have been retained. Of course it is equally possible that this benefit will not amount
to that "enjoyment" contemplated by the statute.
When the grantor does not transfer stock constituting control he
would enjoy merely the right to vote the transferred stock. 0 5 That
he can use this right, in conjunction with others, to maintain control, should have no tax consequence. 0 6 The right to vote the transferred stock is merely a managerial power, and as such, it has been
viewed by the courts as lacking any economic value in a section
2036 (a) (1) context. 0 7 This is not an anomalous result. Were the
reserved right to vote the transferred stock to constitute enjoyment
when voting control is retained, the courts would be faced with the
extremely difficult task of defining voting control when applying this
statute. 08
101. 408 U.S. at 154-55.
102. E.g., Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Il1. 1968).
103. E.g., United States v. Byrum, 440 F.2d 949, 954 (6th Oir. 1970) (Phillips,
C.J., dissenting).
104. Cf. Estate of Pamelia D. Holland, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C.
564 (1943). But see Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. Il. 1968).
105. Cf. materials cited note 3 supra.
106. Yd.
107. Materials cited note 3 sup ra.
108. See 408 U.S. 125, 132 n.4, 137 n.10, 138-39 n.13 (1972). The proportion
of outstanding stock which will constitute voting control is functional to a variety of
parameters. Among these are (1) the type of voting for directors (e.g., cumulative or
straight voting); (2) the number of directors to be elected; and (3) the proportion
of directors necessary to approve any action by the corporation. 1 G. HORNSTEIN,
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 353, 384, 177 (1959). These variables may
render the amount of stock necessary to control the corporation as great as 100%.
Additionally, in certain situations, a minority stockholder may have significant
interest in determining corporate policy. For example, a corporation has three stockholders, A, B, and C, each holding 49%, 49%, and 2% respectively (assume 51%
represents voting control). If A and B are continually opposed to each other's position,
C's mere 2% will represent a controlling interest. Whomever C votes with will prevail.
C may thus be able to exact a considerable advantage from either A or B, as an inducement for his vote. Might C's interest be construed as voting control?
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B. Section 2036(a)(2): Generally
Section 2036 (a) (2) presents altogether different questions. Here,
to cause inclusion in his gross estate, the grantor merely has to retain
the right-either alone or in conjunction with others-to designate the
beneficiary of the property or income.
If it be assumed in the aforementioned hypothetical that it is
in fact beyond the power of the grantor to obtain voting control, section 2036 (a) (2) would be inapplicable despite his retention of the
right to vote the transferred stock. The grantor would be unable to
regulate the flow of income between the income beneficiaries and
and remaindermen.' 0 9 If, however, retaining the right to vote the transferred shares with his other interests results in giving him voting control, problems will arise.
The argument in this situation, as in Byrum, is as follows: Voting
control in the corporation will enable the grantor to elect the board of
directors who will be responsive to his desires regarding the dividend
policy of the corporation. Thus, the grantor will be able to influence
the granting or withholding of dividends. Since these dividends are to
be the source of income to the trust, by withholding dividends he can
shift the benefit of the trust from the life beneficiaries to the remaindermen. The grantor will have thereby retained the power to designate the beneficiaries within the meaning of the statute.
As the Court in Byrum mentioned, the grantor has retained
merely the power to designate the beneficiaries, not the right to do
so.110 A right has been defined as "a capacity residing in one man of
control, with the assent and assistance of the state, the actions of
others."'' Plainly, the grantor will have no enforceable right to designate the beneficiaries."12 Nevertheless, since there is contrary precedent
holding powers and rights to be synonomous,1" 3 they will be so regarded
for the remainder of this discussion.
109. Cf. Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Mem. 1054 (1945).

110. 408 U.S. at 135-40.
111. BLACe'S LAW DicTiONARY 1486 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
112. See Estate of Harry H. Beckwith, 55 T.C. 242 (1970), acquiesced in, 1971
INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 6; Estate of George H. Burr, 4 CCH Tax Mem. 1054 (1945).
Cf. Estate of Marvin L. Pardee, 49 T.C. 140 (1967); Estate of Aline P. Peters, 23
Tax Ct. Mem. 994 (1964); Estate of Willard V. King, 37 T.C. 973 (1962).
113. See, e.g., United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Lober v. United
States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946);
Joy v. United States, 404 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1968).
The contradictory positions probably arise from the generic classification of that
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C. Section 2036(a)(2): Jenningsv. Smith
In considering the applicability of section 2036 (a) (2) to the
hypothetical, Jennings v. Smith 1 4 is an appropriate place to begin.
That case indicated that a reserved right to designate the beneficiary
ceases being a right when it is qualified by an external standard enforceable in a court of equity. To determine whether such standard is
present, it becomes necessary to inquire as to the possible constraints
upon the grantor's power. It should be noted at the outset that the
grantor's power is premised upon a syllogism-he has the power over
the board of directors; they have the power over the dividend policy;
therefore, he has the power over the dividend policy. If it can be established that either: (1) the grantor's power over the directors is limited
by an external standard enforceable in a court of equity; or (2) the
directors' power over the dividend policy has somehow been curtailed,
then the grantor will not possess the power to designate the beneficiaries, since such "power" will be sufficiently qualified.
Ostensibly, there are several relationships, both legal and equitable,
which may meet the criteria of an ascertainable external standard. The
directors who are to determine dividend policy of the corporation are
subject to certain restraints. Before dividends may be issued, accumulated or current earnings must at least equal the anticipated dividend. 15
Additionally, the corporation must be solvent, in a bankruptcy and/or
equity sense."" If the directors refuse to declare dividends, and surplus is allowed to accumulate, there may be penalty taxes, though admittedly this will not occur until such surplus exceeds $100,000.117 In
such event, the directors might find themselves liable for such taxes
through a stockholders' derivative suit."18 There remains also the general fiduciary duty of the directors to act honestly and in good faith
regarding the interests of the corporation and of the stockholders." 9
which the settlor retains--"power." Power has been defined to mean "[t]he right, ability,
or faculty of doing something." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
The power that is retained may or may not be capable of legal enforcement. Only when
such power is legally enforceable, however, will it be a "right." Otherwise, it will be
a mere ability or faculty.
114. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
115. G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 108, § 463.
116. Id. (Supp. 1968).
117. See INT. RV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 531-37.
118. G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 108, § 465, at 587.
119. Id.§§ 436, 437.
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When applied to the dividend policy pursued by directors, this duty appears to lack any external standard enforceable in a court of equity.
The mere fact that a corporation reports a substantial surplus or
large profits out of which a dividend might lawfully be declared is not
of itself sufficient ground to compel the directors to make a dividend.
They have a wide discretion to use the corporate resources to expand
the business, to increase executive compensation... and to establish
various reserves if they consider it to [be in] the [best] interests of the
corporation to do so.' 20
The grantor is also bound to a fiduciary duty by virtue of his voting control. 121 He will be "held to the duties and liabilities of management when he goes beyond his power merely to elect the board of directors .... -122 In practice, this merely means that he has to act
honestly and in good faith.123 This constraint, like the several fiduciary
duties of the directors, hardly provides a sufficient external standard.
The grantor has no fiduciary duty with respect to the trust. He retains the24power to vote the transferred stock solely for his beneficial

interest.

[I]f the settlor owned all the stock of a corporation and created a
trust of half the stock for the benefit of his children, and provided
that the trustee should not sell the stock without his consent, he would
not be under any duty to the beneficiaries to consent, even though the
sale would be clearly advantageous to the trust, since it is fair to suppose that he reserved the power to prevent a sale for the
purpose
125
of protecting his own interest in the stock which he retained.
Similar logic should apply if the grantor retains the right to vote the
transferred stock.
A modification of the original hypothetical is needed to facilitate
the understanding of one additional point. Assume that the trust instrument reserved in the grantor the right to veto any transfer of the
stock by the trustee. Further, the trustee is given the discretionary right
to distribute income to the life beneficiary, and if necessary, to invade
the corpus according to some external standard (for example, to pro120. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 231, at 552, (rev. ed.
1946). See Soled, supra note 2, at 217.
121. See G. HORNSTEIN, supranote 108, § 365.
122. Id.
123. Cf. id.
124. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TRUSTS § 185, comments c & d (1959); 2 A.
SCOTT, supranote 89, § 185, at 1477-79. See Soled, supra note 2, at 227-29.
125. 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 89, § 185, at 1478-79. See Soled, supra note 2, at 228.
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vide for the education of the grantor's son). The trustee, a fair-minded
person, finds in his discretion that payment to the bereficiary is necessary (for example, because grantor cut off his penurious law student son
who is ineligible for financial aid due to his father's plentitude) . As the
grantor has used his influence over the directors to keep the dividend
payments low, the income in the trust is insufficient to meet the payments deemed necessary. The trustee proposes sale of the stock to meet
the needs of the beneficiary; the grantor vetoes such proposed sale. If
the trustee can compel the sale, the grantor's power will have been
limited by an external standard enforceable in a court of equity. Who
shall prevail?
The second Restatement of Trusts implies that if the power to
veto were held by the grantor for his sole benefit, then the only duty
of the trustee would be to ascertain whether the attempted exercise of
the power was within the terms of the trust instrument. 126 Since the
power was retained in the trust instrument the grantor should prevail
(recall that it has already been demonstrated that the power was retained solely for the beneficial interest of the grantor). Thus, the apparent ability of the trustee to invade the corpus does not limit the
grantor's veto power. The dominance of the grantor's power renders the
trustee's "power" to invade the corpus nugatory.
It can be seen in the two hypotheticals that the only nonillusory
constraints upon the exercise of the grantor's power to designate the
beneficiaries are: (1) the imposition of a penalty tax on excessive accumulations when the grantor causes the directors to withhold dividends; and (2) a power restraining the directors from declaring
dividends when the financial condition of the corporation is severely
depressed. However, these two restraints do not amount to a sufficient
determinable standard within the Jennings rule. The "power to designate" plainly remains within the range from zero (break-even/insolvency) to $100,000 (point of imposition of the penalty tax). Even
after $100,000 has been accumulated, the directors may still be able to
withhold dividends if some valid reason for accumulating the surplus
can be shown. 12 7 Thus, applying the Jennings rule to the hypotheticals,
the stock would be includible in the decedent's gross estate since the
settlor maintained the power to designate the beneficiaries within the
meaning of section 2036 (a) (2).
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 185, comments c & d (1959).
127. See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 120, § 231.
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D. Section 2036(a)(2): State Street Trust Co. v. UnitedStates
State Street Trust Co. v. United States,2 8 provides an alternative
basis for imposing tax liability. This decision requires inclusion pursuant to section 2036 (a) (2) whenever the aggregate effect of the
grantor's powers will enable the shifting of the benefits of a trust between the life beneficiaries and the remaindermen, within whatever
limits a court of equity might rationally impose. Inclusion is mandated
despite a finding that each power individually is sufficiently limited
by an external standard in accordance with the Jennings principle.
Thus, in the original hypothetical, if by some quirk the Jennings requirement is deemed to have been fulfilled-i.e., each power is determined to be sufficiently limited by an external standard enforceable in a court of equity-then tax liability -ill occur if the grantor's
aggregate powers enable him to shift the benefits of the trust between
the two classes of beneficiaries.
In the application of Jennings to the hypothetical, it was demonstrated that the total "constraints" leave at least that range of accumulated income from zero to $100,000 in which it is highly doubtful that
any court would interfere with the directors' dividend policy.2D As was
previously stated, the powers and limitations of the directors regarding
the dividend policy should be imputed to the grantor when seeking
to apply section 2036 (a) (2). Since by causing the withholding or the
declaration of dividends the grantor can shift the value of the trust
between the life beneficiaries and the remaindermen, State Street Trust
should mandate inclusion of the stock in his gross estate. Grantor's aggregate powers enable him to cause the shifting, therefore he has retained the right to designate the beneficiaries within the meaning of
section 2036 (a) (2).
E. United States v. Byrum
Applying the conclusions of the foregoing analysis to United
States v. Byrum, 13 0 it appears that the Court was correct in holding
section 2036 (a) (1) ineffective to cause inclusion of the stock in Byrum's
gross estate. Virtually unanimous precedent has held that the mere
reservation of management powers does not amount to the retention
128. 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
129. See text at notes 120 & 127 supra.
130. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
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of an economic interest in the property-even if voting control is
thereby maintained.1 81 If a contrary view were taken, courts would
face severe difficulties in defining "voting control" and in determining
when the retention of such control should constitute an economic interest.1 2 Thus, the Court's position regarding section 2036 (a) (1), was
justified, even if founded upon merely practical considerations. The
soundness of the Court's application of section 2036 (a) (2) is, however, open to question. The majority's position respecting this section
would be correct only if it provides tax liability solely when the right
33
to designate beneficiaries is retained.
This writer is of the opinion that the Court validly and correctly
differentiated between the "right" to designate and the mere "power"
to do so, despite contrary dicta in O'Malley.34 Section 2036 (a) (2) purports only to tax in situations where the grantor has retained the "right"
to designate the beneficiaries. Byrum had no such right, merely the
power. If the Court had definitively stated this position, further discussion concerning the application of section 2036 (a) (2) would have
been unnecessary. However, the majority was not content to let its
argument end here. It sought to show that Byrum's alleged power to
designate the beneficiaries of the trust was sufficiently limited by a
variety of constraints on such "power."
Although neither the majority nor the dissent mentioned Jennings, both apparently grappled with the principle of that decision.
The majority found that significant constraints existed and limited the
powers of both Byrum and the directors. However, the dissent dismissed these "restraints," claiming that they were entirely inadequate
to limit the settlor's power to designate the beneficiaries. The dissenting
position is certainly the more sound, in view of the previous discussion of the illusory nature and effect of these powers. 35
If a contrary result were to prevail in this case, anomalous results
could readily follow. If a settlor transferred stock to a trust, retaining
no managerialpowers over the transferred stock, but maintained voting control in the corporation because of ownership of other stock, the
transferred stock would be includible in his gross estate. He would
131. See materials cited note 3 supra.
132. See generally 408 U.S. 125, 132 n.4, 137 n.10, 138-39 n.13. For a discussion
of this problem, see note 108 supra.
133. See notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text.
134. 383 U.S. 627, 631 (1966).
135. See notes 107-127 supra and accompanying text.
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have reserved the identical power over the directors as Byrum had
done; hence he would have retained the power to designate the beneficiaries. So long as the settlor kept sufficient stock to maintain voting
control, he would be unable to make an inter vivos conveyance of the
stock to a trust without incurring section 2036 (a) (2) liability.81 Additionally, such a holding would force courts to determine the difficult
issue of what constitutes voting control, a task better suited to the legislature. Ad hoc judicial legislation would provide a poor basis upon
which to rely when planning estates and trusts, especially when intending to transfer stock in closely-held corporations. By holding for Byrum,
resolution of such difficulties was properly left to Congress, should they
desire to include Byrum-like transfers within the federal estate tax.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Byrum was assuredly correct considering
both the language of section 2036 and the possible ramifications in the
area of estate planning. The consequences of a contrary holding might
have upset traditional notions of estate planning, without clearly defining their substitutes. If such inter vivos transfers are to be included
in the gross estate for purposes of federal estate taxation, Congress
should promulgate an appropriate amendment to the Code. A provision similar to section 675-which lucidly delineates the retained administrative powers which will cause the inclusion of the trust income
87
in the gross income of a settlor-would be appropriate.1
In the absence of any congressional response, Byrum should have
a negligible effect upon the interpretation of section 2036 (a). The
Court's application of section 2036 (a) (1) merely followed uniform
precedent dating back to 1929: retained management powers do not
constitute "enjoyment" within the meaning of the statute. The application of section 2036 (a) (2), while not resulting in the holding dictated by Jennings, State Street Trust, and Old Colony Trust, nevertheless implicitly adopted at least some of the methodology posited in those
136. Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 Cum. BuLL. 269.
137. In the debates before the enactment of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 675, both

Senate and House committees declared:
The rules for determining when the grantor should be treated as the substantial owner of the trust should be set forth in the statute ....
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4089, 4719 (1954) [emphasis
added].
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cases. However, the holding was in accord with the weight of lower
court decisions which had applied section 2036 (a) (2) to retained
powers in closely-held corporations.
Byrum should authoritatively dispel any contentions by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that such transfers are includible in a
grantor's gross estate pursuant to section 2036 (a). Thus, for the present, grantors of stock in closely-held corporations are free to continue
to transfer such stock, retaining rights which would give them voting
control, without fear of adverse estate tax consequences.
GEORGE
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